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could go skiing without appropriate follow-up 
examinations/ etc. 
4) In failing to perform physical and x-ray 
examinations on a regular basisf etc." 
(R. 269) 
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Df the negligent acts alleged by plaintiff as set forth in 
Instruction No. 1? 
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the jury had found in answer to Question No. 1 that defendant was 
negligent as alleged, it was directed to Question No. 2. 
Question No. 2 reads, "If your answer to Question No. 1 is 
"yes", was such negligence a cause of the injuries received by 
plaintiff?" The jury's answer was "yes". (R 386) The words a 
cause in Question No. 2 clearly refer the jury back to the 
"individually or jointly" language. It can be seen that 
respondent is confusing the negligence concept with that of 
causation, and somehow drawing the insupportable conclusion that 
the words "either individually or jointly" apply to the negligence 
issue rather than the causation issue. This is not the case. 
Furthermore, all of the alleged acts of negligence on the 
part of defendant, having been found to exist, and said negligence 
as alleged having been found to be a cause of plaintiff's 
accident, it follows that the words "either individually or 
jointly" no longer have a meaning. All of said acts of negligence 
were a cause of plaintiff's accident and defendant's point with 
regard to the words "either individually or jointly" have fallen 
victim to simple Aristotelian logic. 
If plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 4 had been given, 
the jury would have been told that any one of the alleged acts of 
negligence set forth in Instruction No 1, if proven, would result 
in a finding of negligence on the part of defendant. But, 
plaintiff's request was denied. 
Requested Instruction No. 4 reads as follows: 
You are instructed that in order to recover against the 
defendant, the plaintiff is not required to prove every 
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< Isewhere in the instructions, for the Court to fail to 
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POINT II 
AS A MATTER Or ^Av* , ,, . . JLNDJLNG THAT 
DEFENDANT ADVISFD PFA- . , ,L SAFELY SKI, 
THE ISSUES OF O 1ENC", ASSUMPTION OF 
RISK, AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE WERE ELIMINATED FROM 
THE CASE. 
£ t page . ° -r respondent's brief, i t: i s stated that "There 
was ample evidence uo £----v - - --.;,e trial court's submission of 
of said 
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contributory negligence and assumption of risk to the jury." 
Appellant takes exception to this statement. The jury found, 
in answer to Question No. 3, and again pursuant to the 
instructions of the court, that plaintiff was herself negligent 
and assumed the risk of injury, by skiing. (R. 386) We take the 
position that this question should not have been presented to 
the jury, and that the answer is totally irrelevant. That is, 
in light of Instruction No. 1 as well as the jury's answer to 
Question's No.l and 2, the issues of contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk, are, as a matter of law removed from 
consideration in this case. 
Let us assume a hypothetical state of facts that plaintiff is 
a passenger in an automobile and that the driver has an impeccable 
record as a safe driver. She is asleep in the back seat. An 
accident happens and she sues. The trial court, in an 
interrogatory, asks the jury the question, "Was plaintiff 
contributorily negligent by being in the automobile?" Can there 
be any question about the fact that submission of the issue of 
contributory negligence to the jury without any guidelines or 
directions under such a situation would be reversible error? We 
submit that use of the word "by skiing" as the only guideline in 
allowing the jury to consider whether plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent, where there was no evidence whatsoever of carelessness 
on the slope on her part, constitutes the same error as set forth 
in the hypothetical question we have posed. The issue shouldn't 
have been submitted, and the answer of the jury to Question No. 3 
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shouldn't be considered. 
The jury's answer to Question No. 3 places squarely before 
the court the pivotal question of whether plaintiff can legally be 
held guilty of contributory negligence and to have assumed the 
risk of injury by skiing in light of the fact that she was on the 
slope as a result of her trusted physician's negligent advice that 
she could ski. 
The abundance of case law cited in appellants main brief 
compels a conclusion that contributory negligence and assumption 
of risk are not defenses under the facts found by the jury in 
this case. 
As we have pointed out, the only issue presented to the jury, 
having to do with defendant's claimed defenses of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk, is found in Question No. 3 
wherein the court allowed the jury to find that plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent and assumed the risk of her own injury 
"by skiing". Allowing the jury to find that plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent and assumed the risk "by skiing" is 
simply not in accordance with sound legal principles in medical 
malpractice cases. Of course plaintiff was "skiing" at the time 
of the accident. If this were the only legal criterion in order 
for a jury to find against plaintiff, then what is to become of 
plaintiff's theory, now supported by a jury finding, that 
plaintiff must prevail if she was "skiing" as a result of a 
trusted physician's medical advice? We take the position that the 
only way defendant could ever have prevailed on his claimed 
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defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk would 
have been if he could establish an evidentiary basis in support of 
a claim that plaintiff was negligent because of the manner in 
which she skied. And, we point out that no such claim was ever 
made by the defense, except in general terms, either at or before 
trial. Obviously, no such claim was made because there was no 
evidence to support it, and the court would have committed error 
if it had allowed the jury to speculate to such a conclusion. We 
again call attention to the evidence which reveals that the only 
witnesses to the accident were Ken Herrick and DaNiece Mikkelsen. 
They both testified that DaNiece was skiing carefully and slowly 
on a gentle slope, when a popping noise occurred, after which 
DaNiece fell to the slope. Prior to her fall, Herrick was either 
skiing backwards or alongside DaNiece, giving her 
instructions. (R. 613-614) 
There was other convincing evidence on this matter. 
Dr. Jack W. Crosland took a history from DaNiece at the 
hospital, while she was in extreme pain and prior to her 
operation. He stated: 
A. "At that time she states that her hip started to 
abduct, which means that the leg goes out to the side, 
and as the abduction was taking place, she felt a 
popping or painful snapping in the hip region and fell. 
She was subsequently taken by helicopter to 
St. Benedict's Hospital. 
Q. Did I understand from this that the history related 
indicated that the popping or whatever happened, 
preceded the fall instead of being a result of the fall? 
A. That's what she told me." 
Further conclusive evidence as to what physically happened in 
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the accident can be found in the hospital records where 
Dr. Crosland sets forth his Description of the Operation as 
follows: 
After removal of the prosthesis and removal of the 
cement, from the proximal femur, it was noted that the 
medial bone was in effect, just a very small shell that 
could be cracked just by flicking it with a fingertip. 
The x-ray report requested by Dr. Crosland, also a part of 
the hospital records, states: 
There is lucency paralleling the shaft of the prosthetic 
device which I believe represents loosening around the 
shaft in most of its length, particularly in the middle 
and distal thirds. 
One stubborn fact emerges. The accident resulted, not from 
the manner in which DaNiece skied, but from the condition of her 
hip. Plaintiff's hip gave way as she was engaging in a careful 
and supervised skiing operation, because of the eggshell thin 
condition of the long cortex in her femur bone. The sequence of 
events is that her hip popped, and then she fell. The exact 
injury which she suffered is the injury which could have been 
prevented had it not been for her physician's negligent medical 
advice and treatment. That is to say, DaNiece Mikkelsen would not 
have even been on the ski slope had she not consulted and obtained 
the approval of Dr. Haslam. 
In support of his contention that appellant assumed the risk 
of injury, respondent states as follows: "While a skier does not 
blanketly assume the risk of any possible injury that may happen 
on the slope, he or she does assume the obvious risks inherent 
in the sport, such as injury stemming from bad weather conditions, 
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heavy snow, or simply falling on the hill." (respondent's brief 
page 31.) Arguably, respondent's statement is true. However, 
considering the facts in the case at barf the statement is not 
supportive of respondent's position. While a skier may be said 
to assume the obvious risks inherent in the sport, it would be 
ludicrous to hold that DaNiece Mikkelsen assumed the risk of 
being misinformed by her trusted physician. 
That is, while DaNiece may have assumed the risk of injury 
caused by running into a rock or tree stumpf she certainly did not 
assume the risk of having her hip pop out of socket while 
carefully skiing down a gentle slope. This is particularly true 
inasmuch as DaNiece - in an effort to obtain competent advice -
consulted her physician prior to taking to the slopes. It is not 
as though DaNiece threw all caution to the wind, strapped on her 
skis, and went charging down the hill. Rather, not certain as to 
the strength, stability, and limitations concerning her hip, she 
took as reasonable a precaution as one could take in like 
circumstances prior to undertaking skiing. Being ill-advised by 
ones trusted physician cannot be considered an obvious risk 
inherent in the sport of skiing such that one may be held to have 
assumed the risk of injury which resulted from acting upon poor 
medical advice. Further, because DaNiece did in fact, prior to 
skiing, male a conscious effort to ascertain whether or not her 
hip was strong enough to undertake skiing, she exercised that 
degree of care which an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person 
would exercise in like circumstances. Therefore, she is not 
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contributorily negligent. 
It may also be noted that respondent's reliance upon Rigtrup 
v. Strawberry Water Users Association. 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1977) 
is somewhat misplaced. While the law regarding assumption of 
risk in Rigtrup is good law, the facts of the present case do not 
support a finding of assumption of risk. Pursuant to Rigtrup, in 
order for a person to assume a risk, there must be a "known 
danger, the risk of which is voluntarily assumed by a party." id 
at page 1250. In the present situation DaNiece Mikkelsen cannot 
be said to have assumed a risk. This is because she was not aware 
of any danger. She was advised that it would be safe for her to 
ski. Justifiably relying upon this advice, she engaged in an 
activity which, as far as she knew, posed no inordinate danger to 
her physical well-being. Accordingly, because she was not aware 
of the risk of danger which actually caused her injury, DaNiece 
could not have voluntarily assumed said risk. That is, it is 
impossible for a person to voluntarily assume a risk which she is 
unaware of. 
In appellant's main brief, we cite some thirty-two cases from 
various jurisdictions supporting the proposition that if plaintiff 
was on the slope as a result of the advice of her trusted 
physician she cannot be legally held guilty of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk. Respondent has ciced not a 
single case which adequately rebuts appellants position. 
Respondent makes an attempt to distinguish Halverson 
v. Zimmerman, 232 NW 754 (N.D. 1930) and Schoonover v. Holden, 87 
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NW 737 (Iowa 1901) - both cited in appellant's chief brief - from 
the case at bar. Respondent claims that while Halverson and 
Schoonover were concerned with jury instructions which sought to 
expand a patient's duties, no such instructions were requested in 
the case at bar. While it is true that the case at bar is 
distinguishable from these two cases insofar as jury instructions 
are concerned, the cases are not as distinguishable as respondent 
might lead us to believe. The reason appellant cited these cases 
is because of the rationale underlying the respective courts 
decisions to reject certain jury instructions. As set forth in 
appellants chief brief at page 23f Halverson and Schoonover stand 
for the propositions that "it would indeed require an unusual 
state of facts to render a person who is possessed of no medical 
skill guilty of contributory negligence because he accepts the 
word of his physician and trusts in the efficacy of the treatment 
prescribed by him. A patient has the right to rely on the 
professional skill of his physician " 
Respondent also tries to distinguish Morrison v. MacNamara, 
407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979) from the present case by stating that 
Morrison dealt exclusively with the issue of a patient's assump-
tion of the risk of a medical procedure, rather than assumption of 
the risk of a dangerous sport like skiing. Respondent further 
states that hk has never raised the defense of assumption of risk 
in reference to any aspect of his medical care. (Respondent brief 
page 38.) This is not entirely true. Inasmuch as it was 
respondents medical care (advice to patient) which put appellant 
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on the ski slopef the defense of assumption of risk is related to 
an aspect of respondents medical care - to wit, medical advice. 
In citing Los Alamos Medical Center, Inc. v. Coe, 58 
N.M. 686, 275 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1954), a case also cited by 
appellants, respondent states as follows: "Los Alamos 
. . . stands for the proposition that contributory negligence was 
not shown to the extent that it would bar plaintiffs recovery as a 
matter of law. In Los Alamos, as here, contributory negligence 
was a factual issue reserved for the jury." (respondent brief 
pages 38-39) 
It is true that in Los Alamos the trial court left to the 
jury the question of whether plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent as a result of following the advise of his physician. The 
jury found in plaintiff's favor on that issue. The appellate 
court, in sustaining the verdict, was not required to decide 
whether, as a matter of law, contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk were no longer defenses if the facts established that 
the patient acted in reliance on a trusted physician's advice. We 
believe that a careful reading of the opinion supports our 
position that if the issue had been before the court, it would 
have followed the majority rule and would have eliminated contri-
butory negligence and assumption of risk from the case, as a 
matter of law. 
Appellant feels compelled to respond to a statement of 
respondent, at page 39 of respondent's brief, wherein he states: 
"There is a distinction between following a doctor's order (as in 
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cases cited by Plaintiff) and simply seeking approval or acquies-
cence in an activity Plaintiff had decided, for her own reasonsf 
to pursue." Where in the world can there be hidden in the body of 
the common law support for such an outlandish contention? 
Respondent cites no case law in support of this statement. Is he 
claiming that the telephone call and the advice given by the 
doctor was simply palaver or small talk? We refer once again to 
the plethora of cases cited in appellant's chief brief in support 
of the proposition thatf as a matter of lawf a patient cannot be 
held negligent if she acts in reliance on a trusted physician's 
medical advice. 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS NO. 1 
AND NO. 2 MANDATE THE GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL ON THE 
ISSUE OF DAMAGES- ONLY, 
At page 41 of respondent's brief, Rowley v. Graven Brothers 
and Company, 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209 (1971) is cited as 
standing for the proposition that a jury verdict should not be 
reversed unless there was an error or irregularity in the proceed-
ing such that there is a reasonable likelihood to believe that in 
its absence there would have been a result more favorable to the 
complaining party. This is precisely the situation at hand. The 
"error or irregularity" in the proceeding was the submission to 
the jury of the is^ue of contributory negligence. Moreover, if 
this error was not committed, there is not merely a reasonable 
likelihood, but rather a substantial certainty that the result 
would be much more favorable to DaNiece Mikkelsen. The error 
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committed resulted in a judgment inconsistent with substantial 
justice, 
A brief review of the common and statutory law concerning 
this issue might be in order. 
The early history of the English common law discloses that 
the courts were reluctant, although not always, to grant a new 
trial on some issues, and support court or jury decisions on other 
issues. But, with passage of time, it became more and more 
apparent that our system of jurisprudence favored disposal, and 
not agonizing continuance, of litigation. It was in this atmos-
phere that the concept that a litigant should be accorded only one 
fair trial on any given issue began to find increasing favor in 
our system of jurisprudence. Thus, after years of study, Rule 
59(a) became a part and parcel of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 
the year 1946. The rule provides that a new trial may be granted 
"to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues", 
either in actions tried by jury or actions tried without jury. 
A Utah committee of lawyers and judges, headed by attorney 
Dean F. Brayton, President of the Utah State Bar, after long study 
and numerous hearings, obtained adoption of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure by the Utah Supreme Court in the year 1949. Rule 
59(a) of the Utah Rules reads in part as follows: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of 
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues, for any of the following causes; 
We have cited many cases in our chief brief wherein courts 
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have invoked Rule 59(a) and limited issues in dispatching the 
business of the court. We submit that every District Court in 
this state now has a long record of invoking Rule 59(a)f as a 
useful and necessary tool in dispatching the business of the court 
and dispensing justice to the litigants. 
Respondent has cited 58 Am. Jur. 2d., New Trials, Section 27 
in support of his failing position that in the event a new trial 
is granted, it should be granted as to all issues rather than just 
to the issue of damages. Let us consider the in-depth language in 
58 Am. Jur. 2d., Section 24. The annotator states: 
. . . an examination of the earlier English 
decisions discloses that the English courts 
generally, though not always, declined to 
limit issues when awarding a new trial, 
proceeding upon the ground that a verdict of 
the jury is indivisible and the judgment 
rendered thereon an entirety which in all 
cases must be dealt with as such. 
Under this view, if a verdict was shown to be 
erroneous with respect to any issue, the 
practice was to direct a new trial as to all 
of the matters in dispute. This is said to 
have been the accepted rule of the common law, 
and in some American jurisdictions, following 
this common-law rule, the power of a trial 
court to grant a new trial as to a part only 
of the issues is denied. No good reason 
appears. however, why a verdict must be set 
aside in toto when the issues determined by 
the jury are in fact severable and when no 
harm will result from retaining the verdict 
and judgment upon those issues not affected. 
All doubt of the power of English courts to 
award partial new trials is cleared up by the 
English Judicature Act which provides that a 
new trial may be ordered on any question 
without interfering with the finding or 
decision upon any other question, and now 
generally accepted view in this country is 
that it is within the power of a trial court, 
where there is more than one issue of fact in 
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a case and such issues are distinct and 
separate in their nature, to order a new trial 
of one issue and to refuse it as to others. 
In many jurisdictions this procedure is 
authorized by statutef rules of practice/ or 
rules of court, but even in the absence of a 
statute so providing when manifest justice 
demands it, and it is clear that the course 
can be pursued without confusion/ 
inconvenience^ or prejudice to the rights of 
any partyy a new trial may/ according to the 
majority view, be limited to a particular 
severable question." 
Andf again, in Section 25/ the annotator states in part as 
follows: 
• • • The guiding principle is that although a 
verdict ought not to stand which is tainted 
with illegality/ there ought to be but one 
fair trial upon any issue / and that parties 
ought not to be compelled to try anew a 
question once disposed of by a decision 
against which no illegality can be shown. 
Thus the parties and the state have been saved 
the expense/ annoyance/ and delay of a retrial 
of issues once settled by a trial as to 
retrial of issues once settled by a trial as 
to which no reversible error appears. 
Here we have a case where the alleged acts of negligence/ one 
of which was that the defendant physician advised his patient that 
she could skif was found to be fact by the jury. There was no 
illegality claimed in connection with this finding. Defendant was 
and is entitled to "but one fair trial" on this issue. Plaintiff 
ought not to be "compelled to try anew a question once disposed of 
by a decision against which no illegality can be shown." This is 
the spirit of Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which follow 
the Federal Rule. 
Again, we point out that the finding of the jury that 
17 
Dr. Haslam's advice put DaNiece on the slope, in the absence of 
any evidence that she was negligent in connection with the manner 
in which she skied while on the slope, eliminates contributory 
negligence, assumption of risk, and comparative negligence from 
the case; and leaves as the sole remaining issue the determination 
of damages. It was the condition of her hip and her physician's 
advice that caused the accident, not the condition of the slopes 
or her talent as a skier. 
CONCLUSION 
It is true that this case has lingered in the court for many 
years. It is also true that justice has been long delayed. Now 
we are at the point of considering the legal import of a jury's 
answers in response to questions propounded by the court in a 
special verdict. It is our position that said answers leave us 
with an untainted finding of fact that defendant was negligent in 
the particulars alleged by plaintiff as set forth in the court's 
Instruction No. 1, and that said negligence was a cause of 
plaintiff's injuries. The foregoing findings completely eliminate 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk from the case and 
leave as the sole remaining issue the question of damages. 
The parties are entitled to only "one fair trial on any 
issue." The parties ha/e had a fair trial on the issues of 
negligence and causation. The evidence on this issue was 
exhaustively and expensively presented to the court and jury by 
the parties to this lawsuit. The decision is in. 
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We respectfully submit that justice demands the granting of a 
new trial on the issue of damages only. 
DATED this a'fi^ day of August, 1987. 
BLACK & MOORE 
Wayne Li Black 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
'jn.c^-fM X rSI. - A . l!\>\.0<— 
Susan B. Diana 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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